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(Left, Moqtada al Sadr has the worst teeth of any non-state actor affecting US policy in history. On right, “We’ll smoke em out, Dick.”)
Someone made a really bad call invading Basra last week. Was it all Iraqi PM Maliki’s decision, or did Iran have a say, what about Cheney and John McCain?
Here’s an LA Times editorial from Monday:
Iraq’s problems were never so black-and-white, but Prime Minister Nouri Maliki’s disastrous attempt to strike at lawless Basra has made them even grayer. For starters, the “criminal elements” in Basra are sworn enemies of Al Qaeda. All of the Shiite factions in Iraq are receiving money, political support and probably weapons from Tehran, which unlike Washington is smart enough to hedge its Shiite bets. Why Maliki made this sudden decision two weeks after feting Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Baghdad is unclear.
Last Tuesday’s invasion of Basra was a stunning, swift defeat for the Iraqi government. After Maliki declared “no surrender” on Wednesday, intra-Shia war broke out in Baghdad and every last southern Iraqi city. By Saturday Maliki was negotiating a cease fire with Moqtada al Sadr. Within 24 hours of Sadr agreeing to a truce, fighting stopped. Sadr flexed: “I control the capital and Basra’s oil flow.” Iraq’s security and oil—and thus de facto national control—was left in the hands of a populist, nationalist Shiite cleric.
Not only did the Iraqi government lose mucho political capital, both the US and Iran, Iraq’s major client states, came out losers, too. Sadr’s Mahdi Army has been the biggest killer of US troops, the major cause of sectarian cleansing, and an all around pain in the ass. Iran, meanwhile, doesn’t gain anything from handing Sadr more power, as he’s foremost an Iraqinationalist. The whole thing makes no sense. Why pick a fight you can’t win?
The LAT hints above that Iranian Prez Ahmadinejad may have played a role. But that’s unlikely. Sure, Iran has Maliki’s two main supporters, DAWA and SCIRI, on payroll. Sciri’s militia, the Badr Brigade, is especially close to Iran, having received decades of funds and training from the Revolutionary Guard. (On a side note, Maliki just merged the Badr Briagade into the Iraqi Amry!)
Sadr is in Iran right now, studying some book called the “Koran” in Qum, the holiest Shiite city ever. Sadr’s Mahdi Army receives arms and money from Iran, too, though his fighters claimed last week they would “never guns from Iran—only from smugglers!” Iraqi Shia still harbor major distrust of Iran. Sadr’s poor urban Shiite base were used by Saddam as cannon fodder in the war with Iran. A million died in that war. That’s a lot of brothers, uncles, fathers, cousins, and friends killed by Iranian hands in a culture of revenge.
Still, since the US invasion Moqtada Sadr and the Iranians have made good. But Iran knows the relationship can only grow so close. Populists like Sadr tend not to want alienate their base, as growing too close to Iran’s government certainly would. At any rate, Iran’s loyalties lie not with Sadr but with Sciri and Dawa.
Over at Informed Comment, Juan Cole finds it funny that John McCain was “surprised” about the Basra invasion . McCain, who visited Iraq a week before the Basra invasion, said Sunday, “I just am surprised that he [Maliki] would take it on himself to go down and take charge of a military offensive. I had not anticipated that he would do that.” Cole adds:
Either McCain really did not know and did not anticipate the trouble in Basra, in which case he does not know much about Iraq and isn’t better qualified to deal with it than anyone else. Or, he and Cheney helped put al-Maliki up to the whole thing while he was there, and now is petrified that someone will hang the fiasco around his neck.
Cheney and McCain encouraging Maliki to reassert control over Basra makes sense. Both were in Baghdad around the same time last month. They both saw that the Surge was showing signs of stalemate. More chaos is a good way to deflect attention from a Surge failure, especially when you can blame Iran for it, which is exactly what President Bush did in a speech last Friday. Also, McCain can use the Iran as The Great Destabilizer as an argument for continued engagement in Iraq. “If we’re not fighting the Iranians in Iraq, we’ll be fighting them at home,” or some bullshit.
The end result: Political capital has shifted from a controllable state entity to a non-state militant. Iraq’s Sciri-DAWA government coalition lack Sadr’s popular support, thus they on US and Irananian support. Therefore the US and Iran are dealing with a weaker Iraqi partner. Of course, the US loses more, as Sadr is a sworn enemy of the occupation. But Iran hardly benefits from rising Iraqi nationalism.
It’s sad. Last week, the Iraqi government demonstrated it was less a national authority than junior-Mayor of the Green Zone (under Big Bro Uncle Sam’s rule of course) and Sadr showed that with a flick of a switch (seriously, does the guy send out a mass text saying “Fight”) Iraq burns.
TAGS: A Milli, election, Iran, Iraq, John McCain, mccain, political, Shiite, war


